

VIA: AIR
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DISPATCH NO. EGMA-4571

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TO : Chief EE (Attn: Chief SR)

DATE: 25 March 1953

FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

ATTN: ☐

Deadline:

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/CACCOLA

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Plans for 1953-54
CACCOLA Training and Operations

☐ by pouch
☐ cable
☐ by pouch
☐ to and files

REF: A. \ EGMA-3272
B. \ EGMA-3720

Plans for 1953-54 CACCOLA Training and
Operations are herewith transmitted for
Headquarters comment.

Approved: ☐ - *rst*

Att: (1)

Distribution:

- ✓ 2-SR (w/att) (1cy w/att hand-carried 26/3/53 by ☐ ☐
1-EE (w/o att)
3-COM (1 w/att) (☐ ☐
2-MOB(CSOB)(1 w/att)

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SUBJECT: Plans for 1953-54 CACCOLA Training and Operations

REF: A. EGMA-3272

B. EGMA-3720

1. The death of Stalin and the emergence of Malenkov to a position of control has had a strong effect, according to CAPABLE 7, on CAPABLE 1 members everywhere. There now appear to be more candidates for internal U.S.S.R. operations than formerly expected, and in addition, CAPABLE 1 is eager to attempt some sort of active work in the U.S.S.R. Naturally, we welcomed the increase in candidates since it will insure our ability to continue to maintain our present standards in selecting personnel for operations. As regards the initiation of "activist" work in the U.S.S.R., this question was reviewed in EGMA-3272. The events of the past few weeks have not induced us to change our belief that we must continue to support a strong "KARKAS" program to insure that we, and the CAPABLE 1 staff, will receive current information on the internal situation from residents in place in the country. Also, we adhere to the principle that "activist" or "diversionist" operations, while valuable, particularly at this time, must be well conceived and executed. The calibre of personnel for these operations cannot be considered inferior to those selected for "KARKAS". Therefore, assessment and a considerable degree of training will be similar. The plans outlined below have been prepared on the basis of the above factors.

2. For 1954, it is expected that the "KARKAS" program will require a minimum of six agents, probably a maximum of ten. Some will be used to replace or reinforce those already in place in European Russia. However, the majority will be allocated, if CAPABLE 7 agrees, to coverage of areas not presently having "KARKAS" residents. These include the Caucasus, the Central Urals, and the Far East. All of these agents will be W/T trained and their operational plans will probably resemble those of the second cycle. However, it is accepted that experience this year may dictate some alterations in our "KARKAS" modus operandi.

3. In addition to the above operations, the following operational suggestions are offered for activist or diversionist work:

a. Four to six individuals to function as singletons or doubletons. They would legalize as in the case of KARKAS agents, then commence their specialized tasks. They differ from the KARKAS agent in that the latter, once having legalized is required to do nothing which will endanger his position as a resident-reporter. The activists-diversionists in this group would be equipped with W/T but would use it solely as an operational control asset, not for routine reporting.

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b. Two "black base" teams to be established in areas where, by 1954, we will be in a position to service them effectively. At the present time, the two most likely areas are the Far East and the Northwest U.S.S.R. The Far East team could operate in Primorski or Khabarovski Krai where Japan- or Korea-based aircraft and surface vessels could handle the servicing. The Northwest U.S.S.R. team would be established in either Murmanskaya Oblast or the northern part of the K.F.S.S.R., near suitable lakes on which could land light seaplanes operating from Norway. These teams would consist of at least two W/T operators and three other specialists. Their value would lie equally in the KARKAS as well as the activist fields. For example, if a KARKAS agent desires to exfiltrate an important contact, the latter could be directed or taken to the "black base" and from there be exfiltrated by air or sea. Significant in this regard, was the statement by CAPABLE 7 that he had a contact in the country, who, if we could get him out safely, would be able to take over from CAPABLE 7 every bit of the responsibility for running internal U.S.S.R. operations. From our point of view, of course, the debriefing of a man like this would be of tremendous value, since, according to CAPABLE 7, this man, an emigre from Yugoslavia, was put in before WW II.

As a material reception and exfiltration point, the "black base" would be valuable to the KARKAS agents, but almost essential to the activists. In the case of the former, they could pass out bulky packages containing documents, samples of clothing, etc., and receive new documents, etc. However, if REDSKIN begins to function, much of the support and communications channels for KARKAS residents would be handled via REDSKIN facilities. These would not be used for propaganda and other materials needed in activist work, and it is these items that would be passed via the "black base". Whether in support of KARKAS residents or activists, here is how the point would operate. The material would be dropped in or flown in to the base from abroad. After receipt, it would be broken down into small packets in accordance with instructions. These packets would then be taken to suitable dead drops by the couriers attached to the "black base". Couriers would be non-W/T personnel who would possess sufficient "flash" documentation to travel some distance from the base to place the packet in the dead drop. Location of the drop would be reported to Headquarters via W/T and the location then passed on, again via W/T, to the resident or activist for whom the packet was intended. In getting material out of the country, the reverse of the system would be employed.

4. A separate paper is in preparation on precisely the type of work in which activist-diversionists will engage in the U.S.S.R. However, the principles which will be followed can be presented here because they will remain constant regardless of what special tricks or "gimmicks" may be used by them in carrying out their tasks:

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a. Every attempt will be made to locate activist operations in those areas where KARKAS residents indicate there is fertile soil for such activity. Also, the residents will be expected to guide us by reporting what issues or events should provide the best subjects for exploitation. Finally, it is hoped that it will be the residents who will report on any overt evidence of the effectiveness of activist work in their areas.

b. The emphasis will be on those operational activities which will have maximal effect with minimal risk to the activist agent.

c. These activities will be conceived and executed in a manner designed to exploit the weak spots in the Soviet administrative and bureaucratic apparatus. If these activities can cause confusion and disruption to a point where it becomes evident to the average citizen, then such confusion will produce two results. First, it will render more difficult and less efficient the work of the affected agency as a result of intensified security measures. Second, the dissension caused will provide a suitable subject for additional propaganda, thus intensifying the problem for the Soviets.

5. We propose that the program of training for CACCOLA be carried out in two phases, during each of which there will be two sub-units in operation. For purposes of clarity, we shall refer to these as follows:

Phase I

Sub-unit A	W/T-trained agents
Sub-unit B	Non-W/T-trained agents

Phase II

Sub-unit I	AKTIVIST (black base and singleton or double- ton teams)
Sub-unit II	KARKAS (resident-type missions)

As will be seen, the agents trained in Phase I will be reorganized into the new sub-units in Phase II. Similarly, Sub-unit A will be directly supervised by the officers who will later take over Sub-unit I, while the Sub-unit B officers will handle Sub-unit II.

6. Phase I. In preparation for the forthcoming training season, assessment is scheduled to get underway soon. We hope to have very shortly the names of six individuals who completed the January cycle of the CAPABLE 1 Cadre School plus short

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biographies and their Cadre School assessments. After they complete assessment, we will turn to the graduates of the present cycle which completes its course 1 May. There are believed to be nine candidates from this group. The next cycle of the Cadre School will begin 15 April and finish 15 July. However, we can assess candidates from this cycle any time after 15 June. It is estimated by CAPABLE 7 that there will be about 25 or 30 individuals in this cycle, at least half of whom may be U.S.S.R. operations candidates. In all cases, we intend to give a complete assessment to these candidates and will consider for both KARKAS resident and activist type operations. Those who have acceptable W/T code aptitude will be placed in a basic W/T, fieldcraft, and Sovietization training school in early July (Sub-unit A). This school will continue through the summer until the move to DOB takes place. This will occur, we believe, on or about 1 October.

After the move is completed, the basic course (about 3 months) will be finished and the intermediate three months period begun. During the intermediate period, tradecraft will be added. Thus, by 1 January we should have about 10 to 15 agents ready for advanced W/T training and also for specific operational briefing and practical training keyed to their future mission. These trainees will all be trained in one house as a unit even though their eventual assignments will differ.

After the first two months of training (that is, by September), it will be possible to make concrete suggestions as to which of these trainees will be selected for KARKAS resident work, which for singleton or doubleton activist operations (if we agree that such operations are desirable) and which should function as W/T operators on "black base" teams. After we determine the trainees' suitability for assignment, we will then be in a position to estimate how many additional, non-W/T candidates will be required to make up the remainder of the "black base" teams or provide partners in doubleton units. These non-W/T candidates will be taken from those already assessed as usable agents but without W/T aptitude or from graduates of the next Cadre School cycle in September. These candidates would be sent to DOB as soon after receipt of CSC as possible in order to arrive there not later than 1 November. Upon arrival they would be trained under the overall CACCOLA staff but in a separate house and on a separate schedule which would enable them to catch up with the W/T trainees in matters such as fieldcraft, tradecraft and Sovietization. (Sub-unit B).

7. Phase II. Finally, in January or early February, the singleton KARKAS resident types would be separated from their fellow W/T trainees who were to be paired with partners or added to "black base" teams. Two sub-CACCOLA schools would then result: one, straight KARKAS singletons similar to that presently in operation (Sub-unit I), and one in which teams would be trained as a unit for a specific task (Sub-unit II). Since no "black base"

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operation could be undertaken prior to late May, there would be plenty of time for badly needed team training and field problems. However, depending on dispatch methods and areas available, we will try to get off the KARKAS singletons as soon as possible in the early spring, i.e., late March, early April.

8. To handle the program outlined above is going to require a large, experienced staff from both KUBARK and CAPABLE 1. Presented below is a review of the personnel situation together with recommendations for action needed to meet the requirements. The requirements are based on the organization of a single CACCOLA project under which will be established two sub-units. Much of the instruction and all of the administration for the sub-units will be handled centrally from the project headquarters. However, there will have to be one case officer and assistant for each of the units as well as a communications instructor, in addition to the staff personnel in the project headquarters. It should be remembered that in this project, because of the protocol worked out with and accepted by CAPABLE 7 for his group, the senior case officer and operations officer are not only concerned with the training and operational planning for the current cycle, but also for the control of all CACCOLA W/T sets inside the country.

a. KUBARK:

(1) Chief Project Officer: This post was filled in an admirable fashion by [] who is leaving KUBARK in July. The replacement will be [] who is presently familiarizing himself with the second cycle operations plans and getting to know the agents themselves.

(2) Operations Officer: A project of this scope requires a specialist in the fields of operational intelligence, documents, operational planning, etc., and [] has performed well and efficiently in this role. However, he will be required to return to the U.S. soon after the dispatch of the second cycle in order to complete his 16 weeks basic military training in order to return to KUBARK in time to be effective in the third cycle training and operations period.

(3) Administrative Officer: [] has had the responsibility for handling all finance matters, coordination of supply and equipment procurement for both training and operations, etc., and has done a fine job.

(4) Intelligence Assistant: [] who speaks and reads Russian in addition to her other excellent qualifications, has provided a solid backstop to this complex project, and as the operation increases in scope and size, this sort of assistance will become more essential than ever.

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(5) Training Officer, Sub-units A and I: It is essential that the officer who fills this slot speak Russian and have had training or operational experience. Following the dispatch of CAREFREE, it is recommended that ☐ be given this assignment. ☐

(6) Assistant Training Officer, Sub-units A and I: Here an inexperienced officer but with a fluent knowledge of the Russian language would fit well. P/M training would be desirable.

(7) Training Officer, Sub-units B and II: The same qualifications apply here as in the case of the Training Officer of Sub-unit I. This individual would have to be assigned from DOB.

(8) Assistant Training Officer, Sub-units B and II: Russian speaker with P/M training and, as in the case of the assistant above, he also would have to be assigned from DOB.

b. CAPABLE 1:

(1) Senior CAPABLE 1 Representative and Instructor: CAPABLE 14 will continue to occupy this position. To date our relations with him have been very satisfactory and have been improving steadily as he gains operational experience and confidence. His teaching and understanding of the West has been invaluable.

(2) Assistant CAPABLE 1 Representative and Instructor: Here is needed an individual who could replace CAPABLE 14 and at the same time one who could assist him in either sub-unit in teaching tradecraft and propaganda subjects.

(3) Sovietization and Tradecraft Instructor: CACCOLA 3 has done a good job and should be retained. He works very hard and is useful in other fields as well.

(4) Assistant Sovietization and Tradecraft Instructor: Since the majority of CAPABLE 1 members who are our trainees have been out of the U.S.S.R. for as long as ten or twelve years, Sovietization is extremely important. We are including this slot in the hope that CAPABLE 1 will locate a very recent defector who would be capable of doing the job.

(5) W/T Instructor, Sub-units A and I: CACCOLA 8. Valuable asset.

(6) W/T Instructor, Sub-unit II: CAPABLE 42. He is not only an excellent W/T man possessing theory and ability to teach code, but in addition is an all-round instructor and leader.

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He would be the sort of individual upon whom one could rely, and in whom CAFABLE 1 would have complete trust, to take a "black base" team to Japan for operations there.

(7) Housekeepers: Each unit will require a minimum of one cook and "man about the house" (hausmeister). CACCOLA 8's wife will be available, but for the remainder of the personnel, it is our feeling that they should be recruited from CAFABLE 1 members in the U.S. since they will be familiar with conditions there.

7. This appears to be a large staff, but we have experienced two cycles of CACCOLA and are convinced it is fully necessary and that there is no "padding" anywhere in the estimate. CAFABLE 1's internal U.S.S.R. operations show great promise; they are complex but we hope they will one day be rewarding. It is suggested that Headquarters comment on these thoughts at the earliest opportunity in order that a full exchange of ideas may take place in time to be realized in practice during the 1953-54 season.

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